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Posts from the ‘Media’ Category

Pop Prisoner’s Dilemma

By Steve Saideman

In the past several weeks characters in multiple television shows faced choices that seem much like the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma [PD]. Because PD and the problem of credible commitment are so very central to our understandings of both international relations and intra-state conflict, pop culture can provide some insights about political violence with merely a glance at the TV. The three shows discussed here are The Walking Dead, Game of Thrones, and Community. Each one played a PD-like situation differently, illustrating both the challenges and opportunities that face countries and sub-state actors.

The basic idea of PD is that two players face a situation where mutual cooperation is beneficial, but both are tempted to cheat on the deal and take advantage of the other player. Here the best possible outcome is when I cheat and my opponent tries to cooperate. The worst outcome is the reverse. The second best outcome is if we both cooperate, and the third best is if both try to cheat. I am not going to cite the piles of social science that ponder PD and its applications. The key here is simply that without outside guarantees, it is often very hard for two players to come to an agreement because of the temptation to cheat and the realization that the other player might cheat.

We do not have to go very far from PV@G to see the applications of PD, as Barbara Walter has argued that external guarantees are needed in civil wars because the players in potential settlements are very much tempted to cheat and fear cheating. In International Relations more broadly, PD is useful for thinking about arms races, trade agreements, and more. Not every situation is a PD, but this one model is useful as it illustrates most clearly why actors in IR or in intra-state conflicts may do what is rational for themselves, but leave everyone worse off.

AMC.

AMC.

On television, The Walking Dead’s depiction of PD was perhaps both the most obvious and most deceptive. In that show, two groups of humans struggle to survive in a Zombie-infested post-apocalyptic hellscape. Rick, a former sheriff, leads a band of survivors currently residing in a prison, while the psychopathic Governor leads another group of survivors. For a variety of reasons, there is bad blood between the two. Rick and the Governor meet to bargain over a settlement that would lead to peace between the two non-Zombie communities. The proposed deal involves a division of territory and Rick handing over Michonne, who the Governor hates but also happens to be one of the best fighters Rick has.

Rick seriously considers the situation as PD. Perhaps due to his police training, Rick worries that the Governor might not keep his word. Still, Rick decides at first to follow through. This completely fits with Rick’s history of being a lousy strategist. While giving the Governor Michonne is a very credible signal of a sincere interest on Rick’s part in keeping his word, the Governor does not make any similar kind of commitment.

There is another problem: Rick is playing PD, if poorly, but the Governor does not have the same preferences. Again, in standard PD

exploitation (you cooperate, I don’t) > cooperation (both cooperate) > conflict (both don’t) > sucker (I cooperate, you don’t).

But the Governor prefers conflict to cooperation, so they are really playing different games.

The good news is that Rick is overcome by guilt (his gut) and changes his mind at the last minute. However, the bad news is that he has a principal-agent problem: Merle, one of the newest residents of the prison, decides to take matters into his own hands.

What is the relevance of The Walking Dead’s PD situation for our understanding of political violence? Bargaining in the absence of hierarchy is really hard. If there is no outside authority to enforce an agreement, the temptation to renege and the fear of the other side reneging is often quite enough to stymie any resolution. This we already knew, of course, but the episode reminds us that not everyone is playing the same game. It also reminds us that principal-agent dynamics matter as well, as the elites negotiating the agreement may not be able to control members of their team, their militia, their country. Indeed, one reason why civil wars are harder to end than interstate wars is the challenge of controlling one’s agents. Moreover, this discussion of PD is thus far is solely in terms of what will work or not, rather than what is right nor not. Scholars will sometimes juxtapose the logic of consequences versus the logic of appropriateness. We tend to focus on the former — a situation’s strategic logic — but this logic may be affected by whether actors consider some options to be appropriate, or even imaginable.

HBO.

HBO.

This leads us to the second example of PD in Game of Thrones, again a straightforward bargaining situation. Aspiring queen Dany needs to amass an army, and finds herself in a city selling formidable slave fighters — the Unsullied. Dany offers one dragon in exchange for the entire stock of eight thousand Unsullied. The slaveowner agrees to the deal because dragons are this world’s nuclear weapons, and Dany possesses the only three in existence. The slaveowner’s mistake is again two-fold: he does not imagine that Dany would use her new army to kill the slave masters, and he thinks he can control the dragon.

Again, Dany is not really playing PD because there is no way she would prefer cooperation — giving up a dragon (her baby) in exchange for the Unsullied — to conflict or no deal. But Dany makes it appear that this is not the case. Indeed, she castigates her advisers for arguing against the proposed deal, making her fake sincerity seem all that more real. Everybody believes she is playing PD. The slaveowner is not irrational — he is used to making trades, selling slaves for whatever goods buyers have to offer. He even offers to take the prisoners Dany’s Unsullied army will capture and create a new generation of fighters, expecting the PD to be played again and again. Indeed, the basic expectation of PD is that if you play it only once you get conflict. On the other hand, if you know that you will be playing it over and over again — as in a trading relationship — the benefits of extended cooperation make it rational to cooperate during the first turn and from then on as long as both cooperate.

Here is where the logic of appropriateness comes back in two ways. First, using slaves against an owner is apparently taboo, so the slave master does not even imagine this possibility until it is too late. Second, Dany loathes slavery, so any inhibitions about reneging on the deal are washed away by her contempt for the practice. The funny thing is that she at first has to rely on the Unsullied’s acceptance of slavery since her first move is to order them to kill the slave master. So, she does something inappropriate — commanding slaves — with the hope that they are still obeying orders (a principal-agent problem).

This case is instructive for showing how one plays the game of PD depends in part on the options one considers to be appropriate or not. In bargaining one generally does not consider slaughtering the bargaining partner. But in a Game of Thrones, one kills or dies. Or is that a Game of Zombies?

NBC.

NBC.

Anyhow, this leaves with one last PD. In a recent episode of Community, the study group faced a quandary: they all need a good grade in History and are accidentally in a situation where the professor, played delightfully by Malcolm McDowell, is tied up in Jeff’s apartment. The professor offers the group a deal: whoever lets him go first gets an A, and the rest will get an F. The difference in this game compared to the others is that the players are all friends who care very much about each other and know that they will be interacting down the road. Despite some very strong temptations to cheat by those who are most grade-hungry — two of the characters were dueling to be Valedictorian — they agree to cooperate. Not only is this decision rational given the long term benefits of cooperation, it would be entirely inappropriate to sell out one’s friends for a grade. Given that the two grade hungriest players are also the ones who have the highest standards for how to behave, the logic of appropriateness hits them the hardest overcoming their short-term desires for grade gains.

Community resolves the game with cooperation because the players are indeed a community. There are no real principal-agent problems to mess things up (I choose to ignore a key character for the sake of simplicity), and the logic of appropriateness reinforces the logic of consequences in this case.

Why does all of this matter for those seeking to understand political violence and its absence? PD helps us get a key question: why people, groups, and states engage in conflict. In PD what is rational for individuals leads to suboptimal outcomes — cooperation is preferred to conflict, but the difficulty of making credible commitments and the temptation to cheat get in the way. But as we are tempted to apply PD here and there, we need to remember some key dynamics that may facilitate cooperation or inhibit it.

First, as two of the three cases here suggest, both sides need to be playing the same game. In many civil wars, the negotiations may include parties that have a genuine preference for war (one category of spoiler), so reassurance, credible commitments, outside guarantees, or other recommended solutions to PD may simply not work. Instead, those seeking peace will either need to alter the preferences and incentives of those who are playing a different game or eliminate them.

Second, the simplification of PD ignores the fact that in most situations those that are doing the bargaining must gain the obedience of those under them. Actors on the ground may not always follow the intent of those calling the shots. This can complicate matters in a variety of ways that we need to take seriously.

Third, we need to take seriously the possibility that players may vary in what they imagine to be legitimate policy options. For some, ethnic cleansing is unimaginable. But for others, it is not. When we think about why there is actually more peace than violence in the world (yes, it is true but we tend to notice the violent situations more), it might be that most situations are iterated — you rarely can wipe out the other side in the first move. But it may also be that people find cooperation to be the appropriate strategy and cheating to be wrong. For instance, the Quebec separatist effort has been almost entirely peaceful. The one time that separatists in Quebec used violence, everyone in the community found it abhorrent and rejected the group. Separatism continues in Quebec, but without violence. So, it may be the case that there is less conflict than we might expect because the future of cooperation outweighs the temptations of today, or it may be the case that for many it is simply inappropriate to exploit the trust of others.

So real lesson is that our students should watch more television: our references to pop culture would make more sense in the classroom. Our students witness multiple examples of prisoner’s dilemma as I have discussed here, as well as the general problem of cooperating in the absence of hierarchy (Lost, Deadwood, and so on). Teasing out how some of the dynamics in these shows reflects the world around them is not only amusing but provide insights into the models we use.

Movies About Political Violence to Watch… and a Few You Shouldn’t

By Joe Young

I recently reviewed a paper that explained how to structure an International Relations course through watching important films. It was a cool paper, and prompted me to consider the best films that teach us something about political violence. Below, I offer a short (incomplete) list of some films that I enjoy and teach us something about political violence. I also suggest a couple non-obvious (the whole Die Hard series and anything with the Rock are no brainers) films to avoid.

1. The Battle of Algiers

Battle of Algiers is the gold standard for a dramatic portrayal of insurgency, terrorism, torture, and colonialism. Most of the actors were actually involved in the Algerian conflict and some of the footage is spliced from real events. If you haven’t seen it, go watch it right now. Stop by, and I’ll lend you my copy.

2. The Siege

MV5BMTcxNDM0OTY5NF5BMl5BanBnXkFtZTcwNzY1NDY0MQ@@._V1_SY317_CR4,0,214,317_So, this one is in the bin at Wal-Mart for like $4.96. It also stars Bruce Willis. I’m probably not helping my cause with any of this information. Given that the movie was made in 1998, it was remarkably prophetic. The movie dramatizes a horrific string of terrorist attacks in New York City (again in 1998) by radical Islamic militants and the subsequent overreaction by the US government (ok, Bruce Willis, but he is a microcosm of the CT community). The CIA tortures, spies domestically, gets into turf wars with the FBI, and there are people who know things and other people aren’t listening to them. Not Oscar-worthy, but worth watching as a canary in the coal mine.

3. District 9

This 2009 science fiction thriller is built on actual events from Apartheid-era South Africa. While the movie is one large allegory about apartheid, segregation, xenophobia, and race, it is also has plenty of action. For students of ethnic conflict, it brings up some really fascinating questions. For example, how much of a particular ethnicity does one have to have in their blood to count as a member of that group? How might this influence being accepted or rejected by one’s group or the alternative ethnic group?

4. Children of Men

MV5BMTkxNDA5MTM5NV5BMl5BanBnXkFtZTcwNTYyNDE0MQ@@._V1_SY317_CR0,0,214,317_As a disclaimer, I enjoy any film about a dystopian pre or post-apocalyptic future. In Children of Men society is on the verge of collapse as women across the globe have been infertile for nearly two decades. The world is roughly broken into countries that have completely collapsed and those that haven’t, with refugees are pouring into the few functioning societies left. The movie spurs discussion about state collapse, refugees, and resource depletion. It also has several long, continuous shots that feel like authentic depictions of war.

Movies to Avoid (or at least don’t take them as a useful guide for understanding political violence)

1. The Dark Knight Rises

MV5BMTk4ODQzNDY3Ml5BMl5BanBnXkFtZTcwODA0NTM4Nw@@._V1_SX214_Why do people perpetrate violence according to Christopher Nolan? Revenge? Check. Insanity? Check. Naked ambition? Maybe. The final installment of this trio is a muddled mess if we attempt to understand the motivations of the main specialists in violence (Batman and Bane). It tries to turn the simple Manichean battle of light and dark from movies, such as the Lord of the Rings, Star Wars, etc. on its head, but it drops and disfigures the baby into something that just doesn’t make sense. Leaving aside the horrible crime connected to the film, it feels like violence for violence’s sake and I felt a tad dirty watching. (For an alternative take on the The Dark Knight Rises, see Christian Davenport’s piece on the film’s view of political violence.)

2. Rendition

Is torture moral? Does it work? These are the critical competing questions most think we should ponder when considering policies of so-called enhanced interrogations. Can we get any inspiration from Jake Gyllenhaal to answer these questions? Unsurprisingly, the answer is no. Torture is used, it is unclear whether the information is useful, it is unclear whether the recipient was guilty or innocent, and Jake Gyllenhaal waffles over his role in all of it. I hear Zero Dark Thirty also flubs torture, but to be fair, I haven’t seen it (by design).

What am I missing? What other good films should be added to the list? Which should be avoided?

Friday Puzzler: Twitter and War

By Barbara F. Walter

Back in November, the Israeli Defense Forces fundamentally changed how governments chose to communicate with an enemy during war. Rather than go on TV, rely on newspapers, or simply remain silent about the decision to attack Hamas in Gaza, the Israeli government tweeted.

This was soon followed by tweets directed at the Hamas leadership explicitly warning of imminent attacks.

Today’s puzzler is this: Why did the Netanyahu government choose to announce its attack so publicly via Twitter? Why warn your enemy of an imminent attack when your goal is to hunt and kill them?


Answer to last week’s puzzler:

Last week I asked why the Obama administration has been silent about the ability of drone strikes to limit civilian casualties, when compared to other available methods of targeting extremists. Reader Greg Sanders offered a clear and concise explanation:

“The simple answer might just be that the general public is not a significant limiter on the President’s foreign policy powers in general and in this specific case. If the public doesn’t vote based on the issue, isn’t launching major protests, and isn’t contacting the members of Congress, than the incentive to make a case to appeal to the public is minimal. Similarly, any challenge on the civilian casualties front is likely to come from the left, so there’s no need to rebut Republican claims on the matter. Thus, since public disapproval isn’t really a concern, secrecy (driven in part by the internal politics of target states) trumps.”

I couldn’t have said it better myself.

How Not to Get Published in the Iran Review

By Andrew Kydd

Occasionally an Iranian journalist sends me an email asking my opinion on various foreign policy issues facing Iran and the United States. I assume that journalists in Iran, particularly those at Fars New Agency, are agents of the state, so I look on this as pro-bono consulting work for the Iranian government. And since “occasionally” is more than once — which is how many times the US government has sought my input — I am naturally flattered and do my best to respond promptly. Usually these responses disappear into the void, but since a new request comes along after a few months to a year, it seems like I am at least still on someone’s list.

Recently, I got a request from Kourosh Ziabari from the Iran Review for a more structured interview. He even called me up long distance from Teheran, making me feel even more important. I was therefore excited to answer his questions. When I got them via email, I was not disappointed. Ziabari’s questions were familiar, presuming US decline and seeking affirmation and explanations for that welcome trend. So I happily sent in my responses, thinking this time they might actually be published in some electronic form.

A couple of weeks went by, nothing. Apparently my responses were not deemed worthy of publication. I checked out the website, and found that I was actually only one of several US scholars who they had reached out to for their views, some of which were published after I sent in my responses! Included on the list were several people I knew, or at least knew of, such as Bartholomew Sparrow, John Owen, Guilio Gallarroti and Bill Wohlforth. I can think of several reasons for why my answers were found wanting, including the fact that they were much briefer and less thoughtful than the others’. However, I suspect that an additional factor may be that my answers were much snarkier than theirs.

Two weeks ago, I wrote to Mr. Ziabari asking if my interview was not going to be published. He wrote back assuring me that it was, and that the delay had been occasioned by a lot of work related to an international conference they were covering. In the interim, a number of interviews have appeared, including a new series on the iniquities of the international sanctions regime.

It is possible that Iran Review will eventually post my answers, but in the blog age, we content providers have become impatient with the rigidities of the editorial system and strive for unmediated contact with you, the reader. So I hereby present my answers to Mr. Ziabari’s questions. Here’s what the Iran Review didn’t want YOU to read. Or at least has not got around to publishing yet.


Q: As you know, the unipolar, hegemonic system of global governance led by the United State constitutes the basis and structure of current international order. In this regard, some people believe that the signs of the decline of the United States and a consequent transformation in the international order have begun to emerge. A change based on the founding of a power balance against the United States has begun to emerge in the global equations of political power. What’s your analysis of this change and the challenges it poses to U.S. hegemony?


At a military level the international system is still unipolar and will probably remain so for the foreseeable future. The only serious potential competitor to the US is China. However, China is still very far behind the US in military technology and force projection capabilities. It takes time to build these capabilities.  They have just commenced operations with their first aircraft carrier, but the US has 10. In 20 to 40 years time they may start to catch up. It’s not clear what that might mean for the Middle East. During the Cold War the US faced a peer competitor in the Soviet Union and the US still dominated the Middle East, arguably more than it does now. Chinese dominance may not be a welcome substitute, when the time comes. Economically, it’s a different story. The US is facing economic constraints, and the Chinese economy will probably soon surpass the US economy in sheer size. But there is always a lag between economic strength and military strength.

Q: Some political scientists believe that the United States is voluntarily retreating from its position as a global hegemon, as a result of a remarkable increase in the costs of the unipolar and hegemonic order and the considerable decrease in its utilities. What’s your viewpoint in this regard?

There is a lively debate about this topic. See the attached. [This was a copy of Brooks, Ikenberry and Wohlforth in International Security.] Personally, my view is that the Iraq and Afghanistan wars were long and costly because they were counterinsurgency campaigns, which are always long and difficult. If the US had simply overthrown those regimes and then left, or better still managed the threat they pose in a more rational manner, these costs would have been avoided. I’m not convinced that US leadership, aside from those ill-conceived wars, is really all that costly.

Q: The global capitalistic economy is collapsing and its consequences for the uni-polar and hegemonic order are beginning to appear gradually. What do you think about the impact of the downfall of global economic recession and its effects on the compasses of the U.S. power?

The “global capitalistic economy” is far from collapsing. There was a financial crisis in 2008 due to a variety of factors like poor regulation of the mortgage sector in the US, and over-leveraging in some countries. However, most countries are experiencing economic growth again, with a very few exceptions. There is concern over the stability of the Euro because of the Greek fiscal problems but Europe, and capitalism, will survive even if the Euro goes away. What constrains the US is its own deficits and debt service obligations, so the US needs to retrench a bit and pay down its debt and invest at home. However, as noted above, most of the intelligent and worthwhile aspects of US leadership are not actually that costly.

Q: It’s widely believed that based on the emergence and intensification of global resistance against capitalism and liberalism, especially resistance on the microphysical level of global power against the lifestyle of imperialist system, the political power and influence of the United States has been diminishing in the recent years. What’s your take on that?

I’m not sure who widely believes this, outside of Iran and North Korea. The US remains one of the most influential cultural forces in the world. Where did PSY sing “Gangnam Style” on New Year’s Eve? Times Square, New York. The cultural world is wonderfully diverse, with many interconnected centers of excellence and creativity: Milan, Paris, London, New York, Los Angeles, Tokyo, Seoul, Moscow, Beijing, Mumbai, the list goes on. A few regimes are attempting to shut themselves off from this, some like Saudi Arabia and Iran in the name of Islam, North Korea in a naked bid for regime survival. But these are isolated dark spots on an otherwise brightly lit globe of interaction.

Q: According to some studies, the resistance and opposition of the United States’ domestic forces against the interventions of the U.S. government in the other countries and the imperialistic traits of the U.S. political system have been contributing to the weakening of the global position of the United States. Would you please share your perspective on that with us?

Leaving aside the 50-year-old communist jargon, yes, many people in the US are not very pro-war or pro-intervention these days. Particularly among Democrats, there is a feeling that it is time to invest at home. However, if you are attempting to gauge US opinion on a potential US strike on Iran, don’t kid yourselves. President Obama has repeatedly said that he will not tolerate a nuclear armed Iran, and that deterrence is not an option. Given the pace of Iranian nuclear developments, it would seem that the last chance to stop the program will be this summer. Given the Iranian regime’s adherence to the nuclear program, I am pessimistic that there will be a negotiated solution, and hence think a military strike is likely. Since the conflict would be a quick airstrike, with no ground troops or occupation, US public opinion would not be that opposed and could easily be talked into supporting the action. Nor would it be that costly in comparison to the Iraq or Afghanistan wars. So if something prevents a US strike on Iranian nuclear facilities, it won’t be the cost and it won’t be US public opinion.

Q: Aside from these propositions which we’ve mentioned as the factors contributing to the decline of the U.S. socioeconomic and political power and the downfall of the imperialism, can you think of other possibilities which may in one way or another further and accelerate the demise of the U.S. Empire?

I worry that the Iranians are living in a dream world. I wonder if Saddam Hussein thought along these lines in the spring of 2003, or January 1991. The US is not going away, as far as the Iranian’s are concerned. If the US decides to strike Iran, China isn’t going to stop the US, and neither is Russia. US defense spending could be cut in half and still greatly exceed any other country, and still give it the ability to take out Natanz and the other facilities. Wishing it away is not rational strategic analysis.

Best,

Andrew Kydd

Can We Please Have Useful Reporting?

npr_logoBy Will H. Moore

Over the weekend National Public Radio broadcast a story about rebel gains in Syria. During the segment host Rachel Martin and reporter Deborah Amos discussed the fact that the Syrian government was permitting aid to travel via truck from Damascus to the rebel-held north portions of the country. Martin asked Amos why the UN couldn’t just deliver the aid through Turkey, which is closer to the areas where the aid is needed.

This sort of morality play disguised as journalism drives me to distraction: not only ubiquitous, it also obscures analysis and understanding. The question should never have been asked, but questions like it always are because they cater to a Manichaean narrative – bad, evil people are preventing UN aid workers from assisting innocent victims. This narrative infantalizes the forced migrants who have fled, and at the same time obscures understanding about why the situation occurs.

Image by The Guardian.

Image by The Guardian.

Why must aid be channeled through Damascus? First, like anyone else seeking to cross an international boundary, aid agencies (UN, other IGO or NGO) must gain permission from a country to operate. Second, aid implies shipping, and shipping raises the spectre of smuggling. A reporter like Amos is well aware that intelligence agencies sometimes operate under the cover of aid work, so while it is certainly defensible to judge Assad’s decision to restrict aid to the rebel-held areas to routes beginning in Damascus as reprehensible, we must also recognize that it is both prudent and sane. Martin and Amos’ exchange obscures the latter to implicitly highlight the former.

Third, and likely most importantly, one might wonder why Assad would permit humanitarian aid to flow to the north at all. He certainly wasn’t concerned about the death and misery of those people when he authorized the military missions from which they fled. Alas, the five minutes of reporting by Amos offers nary a hint. Yet the answer is plain: by running aid through Damascus Assad’s regime can skim, and perhaps even gouge, the shipments. In addition, forcing aid through Damascus also permits a channel via which to circumvent sanctions. During the 20th century the renegade Rhodesian regime weathered international sanctions in no small part because there was no feasible way to trade with neighboring Malawi or Zambia other than via rail lines running through Rhodesia. It was a widely known “secret” that the Rhodesians not only skimmed shipments, but also smuggled via cargo marked for delivery elsewhere

Whether Martin and/or Amos are incompetent or shills catering to ratings I have not an inkling. But it is important to underscore that their exchange is so common to be banal: I pick on Amos only because I caught the report and cobbled together a few minutes to write this. I could literally write this post about half a dozen different reporters per day. That fact makes each instance no less frustrating.

@WilHMoo

The Coup Was The Revolution

By Will H. Moore

A quick tour of stories covering the recent national elections in Egypt reveals a couple of standard news narratives (e.g., The Miami Herald worries that the election will be “polarizing, not unifying,” while The Economist explains the success of extremists as the failure of moderates, and NPR tells us they were “marred by violence”). We expect journalists to reduce complex events and processes to well known, easily digested narratives. What I find remarkable is the extent to which scholars who serve as news analysts tend to do the same.

In early February 2011 I observed a coup d’état in Egypt: subordinate military officers rejected Hosni Mubarak’s claim to rule the country, declared themselves sovereign, and placated the crowds in the street by promising elections. The scholars I saw on television and in print joined the chorus declaring that a revolution had taken place: the people of Egypt rose as one, toppled a dictator, and ushered in democracy. I found no mention of an Obama administration-supported coup that aborted what might have been a popular overthrow of a dictator. To be sure, Revolutionary Peoples’ Councils are hardly a foundation for the construction of government respect for human rights (think Robespierre’s Reign of Terror, Che Guevara’s show trials in Cuba, the 1979 Iranian Revolution, etc.). But I was nonetheless disappointed by the failure of academic commentators to distinguish between a situation where the military steps in from one where it refuses to do so.

Three recent posts about the Egyptian elections suggest that my pessimism may have been premature. Blogging for Foreign Policy, Scott Bleiweis shows promise with the title “Egyptians Wonder “Where’s the Revolution?”,” but then offers us this:

“That’s the thing with democracy, you never quite know how it will turn out. It’s too early to say whether this election will solidify democracy or signal a reversion to something else.”

Solidify democracy?

But check out Ed Husain, blogging for the Council on Foreign Relations, and Mariz Tadros, blogging for African Arguments.

Husain writes “the military top brass… is only too keen to maintain control of the Egyptian economy and independence from civilian rule,” and Tadros offers:

“Egypt may be following one set of democratic procedures, but it is not, by any stretch of the imagination, a transition to democracy, irrespective of who becomes the next President.”

OK, is Tadros suggesting that the key issue is whether SCAF will step aside? Echoing arguments by others that the SCAF and the Muslim Brotherhood formed an alliance in 2011, Tadros contends that

“The foundations for a full and comprehensive hold on power are consequently in place. The Brotherhood is now seeking to mobilize support as the guardians of the revolution. Yet it is hard to forget that it was their informal entente with SCAF that led to the capture of the revolution by the military. The sad truth is that if the Muslim Brotherhood win, they are not going to be the last bastion in defence of the revolution, they will reproduce their own new strand of totalitarian rule – upheld in the name of God – and they seem to assume a monopoly in representing him.”

It turns out that it is not difficult to find Egyptians who are concerned about the SCAF coup and dubious that it will step aside. I am partial to this SCAF Remix, but A Year in the Life of Egypt’s Media provides considerably more information.

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