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Posts from the ‘Repression’ Category

Is Turkey Burning? The Domestic Democratic Peace, Turkish Contention & New York Times Coverage

By Christian Davenport

Photo by Flickr user Eser Karadağ, June 1, 2013.

Photo by Flickr user Eser Karadağ, June 1, 2013.

In 2007, I wrote a book called State Repression and the Domestic Democratic Peace. The main premise was that while democratic governments apply less repression than autocracies (i.e., mass killing, censorship, beating, torture, and politically motivated arrests), they still use coercive behavior and, when politically threatened with violence and/or highly radical threats, they will increase repression significantly – sometimes approaching the levels of authoritarian governments (in particular dictatorships, which tend to repress more than single party governments).

For several weeks now I’ve been reading different reports about what is happening in Turkey (mostly in the New York Times), waiting for some reference to either my book (yeah, I said it) or the voluminous literature on the topic. Perhaps journalists would even speak to someone from the conflict/violence community for some insight. This has not yet been the case. Instead, we are given a blow-by-blow account of the street battles taking place without any regard to what has been written as well as what we know/what we don’t about the phenomenon of interest. Are the events exactly what we would expect? Does the literature on repression, dissent and contentious politics tell us what happens next? Does the literature give us some sense of what journalists should be asking? Are new insights being provided from what is happening on the ground?

From reading news stories we simply have no idea about the questions raised. It all just seems to be new and eventful without much rhyme or reason. Now, this narrative may sell newspapers (well, not as many as back in the day) but this does not really tell us the answer to the questions raised above. I want to take an opening shot at seeing how well we do as researchers and what consideration of this body of work tell us/does not tell us about what is being written/discussed.

Let’s start at the beginning. From the news, we are told that the demonstrations all started when some bulldozers went to raze a park. We are not told how many parks had been removed leading up to the incident, how large the crew was, whether they were accompanied by police, what the unemployment rate was in the relevant neighborhood or how sacred/profane/banal the space itself was. Put simply, no context was provided for what would take place. Now, some researchers would push in this direction – especially those in sociology concerned with specific state–dissident interactions as opposed to the more cross-national work put forward in political science. Basically, however, this information has been missing from the discussion and this is consistent with how people study the topic. Most research, however, while focused on events has been largely “eventfully”– oriented with little history and context of the sort noted above.

We are told that some citizens protested the razing (“early risers” in the literature) and they were quickly joined by others (“latecomers” in the literature). The reason? Well, some (likely the first group) were upset specifically about the park being torn down; others (likely the second group) were upset about the direction of the country under Prime Minister Erdogan, who is perceived to be moving in an increasingly religious way. We are given very little about the first group – something that would be crucial for the work of James DeNardoMark Lichbach, and others. We are given speculation about the second group – something crucial for the work of Karl Dieter Opp and Bert Klandermans. I say we have little here because the reporters are not very clear on whom they talk to and why they selected them.

From existing reports, we are not clear on the sequence of tactics that were employed by the different sides. One story notes that violent protesters existed on Saturday (June 1st) which led to the police using tear gas and water cannons. The readers is expected to believe the protesters started out violently, which is consistent with earlier work that just examine violent behavior on its own but not more recent work that considers escalation. This is especially confusing because a different New York Times article suggests that the police were violent earlier. Sequence matters here, and effects how we understand the conflict. It is one thing if the protesters were initially violent and police responded violently. It is quite another if protesters were initially nonviolent and became violent after the police response (that was violent). This has very different implications for third-party perceptions and processes of diffusion/contagion. For example, work on “backlash” suggests that if repressive behavior (i.e., the coercive government response) is believed to be illegitimate and disproportionate to the behavioral challenge put forward, then civilians will be more likely to join protesters as well as decrease support for the government.

The article on June 15 also disaggregated protesters into leaders and rank/file. This is important because the former seems to get bought off at one point but the latter wants to keep protesting. Such a distinction is important but largely neglected in the social movement literature and other relevant literature, like work on state repression. It does speak to something that James Scott discusses, however, that social movement organizations are far less dangerous to governments than everyday citizens for the former has a readily conceivable and deliverable price where is the latter does not. Indeed it is the latter’s inability to focus that makes them so dangerous. Evaluations of attempts made by the former to control the latter are sorely needed in literature.

Directly relevant to my book as well as the work of others like Fareed Zakaria and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, the role of democracy is kind of lost in the various pieces that were published in the New York Times. The authors seem to want to discount the fact that a democratic governments engages in repression by referring to the Prime Minister as a “dictator”. The only way the authors as well as the citizens can understand democratic repression therefore is to make the country less democratic. But the leader of a complex political system like a democracy and complex society like Turkey cannot be reduced to such a gross simplification — at least not based on existing research. This assumption was largely maintained within earlier work on state repression but it is now standard practice to note that this is not the case. For example, consider discussions of principal-agent dynamics within Neil Mitchell and Emily Ritter and Courtenay Conrad’s work. Indeed, the “authoritarianization” of democracy avoids the larger point: democracies do engage in repressive behavior/human rights violations. They just do it in particular ways. For example, the article references sound bombs, tear gas and water cannons – all weapons largely developed by democratic countries Darius Rejali tells us. It does not mention gunships, massacres and torture – tactics more common in non-democracies. Additionally, the New York Times article on June 1 refers to a quick withdrawal of the authorities and the willingness of particular parts of the government (i.e., the courts) to negotiate. Although not explicitly examined the literature, this is largely consistent with existing work. Moreover, the June 15 article references an 18 day delay in calling out riot police to quell unrest more aggressively. The delay is also a democratic trait, I would maintain, and one that is consistent with existing literature. Discussion of varying rates of participation across diverse repressive actors is less common but within the work of Courtenay Conrad and Will Moore one can expect more research on this topic coming in the future.

I pick on the New York Times not only because it is the newspaper of record and as a New Yorker I tend to gravitate to it repeatedly but also because the Times seems to be pretty well aware of the topic and should know better. Case in point: a while ago I read another New York Times article entitled “Understanding Iran: Repression 101”. This was memorable to me because this work did not reference a single person that studied the topic. Imagine reading a piece about civil or interstate war that did not reference at least one scholar on the topic — unthinkable. I do not blame the Times’ editors completely, however. We, those of us that study state-dissident relationships, should be helping them. The intrastate/domestic conflict/violence community should be revealing and discussing what is taking place, when it makes sense, what it does not make sense, which theories and methods are most appropriate for understanding what exactly taking place of the time as well as which ones are a complete waste of time and we should be doing this in a user-friendly manner. As for the Turkish case in particular, I have a few suggestions, which I will mention below.  In general, start looking for stuff on staterepression.com (which I will begin posting on soon) or my own blog space.  Re Turkey:

First, I advise those of us tracking/discussing/studying the topic to try to chase the actions as well as the actors. If after repression dissident activity increases but different people are doing it, then this means something very different that individuals who were repressed increasing their activity. If we are to understand what is happening on the ground, we need to have some understanding of who is doing what. Without this understanding increased dissident activity is not well understood. Without this understanding, the impact of repression on this activity is not going to be understood either. Related: track the use of the police, militias, the military, courts and the intelligence community.

Second, we need to get away from the simplistic understanding that democracies do not engage in coercive action – especially that directed against protesters in particular and those challenging the government in general. Democracies do indeed engage in repressive action but they use very specific methods to do so and these methods are important for us to understand governance, human rights and effective counter challenging behavior.

Third, as Neil Mitchell’s latest book reveals democratic leaders frequently avoid being held accountable for repressive activity. Much of the coverage concerning Turkey seems to lay the repressive activity itself at the Erdogan’s doorstep but the Prime Minister is never in the street and I’m sure he’s never fired anything. The relationship and the chains of command involved in coercive activity are essential for understanding exactly what takes place. Recall that after the torture in Gitmo was revealed there was a lot of discussion about who should be held accountable for such behavior but essentially the buck stopped in the barracks.

Fourth, related to the last point, Bing Powell’s work also prompts us to pay close attention to what happens electorally after the protest and repression wind down. Within his book, Powell makes the argument that elections are not always the best mechanism for revealing citizen preferences or accountability. Individuals may think about a variety of different things as they step into the ballot box and quite frequently what they think about is not earlier repressive behavior. The New York Times narrative would seem to push in the direction of the Turkish Prime Minister being held accountable for the repressive behavior we are now seeing, and by being held accountable he will likely be removed. Existing literature suggests that this is not the case and indeed what this work would suggest is confusion, obfuscation and continued presence in power. Now, no one has examined this yet – not explicitly but it is consistent with most research on the topic.

So as things unfold in Turkey I suggest that we not only look at the streets of Turkey for answers as well as questions but we also consider what knowledgeable individuals about the region have to say as well as those who study the topics directly involved (i.e., state repression and political dissent). Also, keep your eyes out for “Understanding the World: Repression 102”.

You Cannot Forget What You Do Not Know: Celebrating Martin Luther King Day

By Will H. Moore

Today in the United States we have a federal holiday not due to the Presidential Inauguration, but to honor Martin Luther King, who was struck down by gunfire outside of his hotel on 4 April 1968 in Memphis, TN. He was in Memphis to support a sanitation workers strike organized by the man who introduced him to non-violent civil disobedience, Reverend James Lawson. We will celebrate the MLK who is best summarized in his speech on the March on Washington (I Have a Dream) as well as the one he gave the night before he was slain (I have been to the Mountaintop). What we will not discuss or remember is the FBI’s remarkable campaign to demonize and discredit him. And that is fuktup. So I write this, in Quixotian fashion, for those unfamiliar with the basic facts who prefer to know. May you not forget.

This history is hardly hidden. Rather, it is ignored. The United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities begins its Final Report (aka the Church Report, 1976) with these words:

From December 1963 until his death in 1968, Martin Luther King, Jr. was the target of an intensive campaign by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to “neutralize” him as an effective civil rights leader. In the words of the man in charge of the FBI’s “war” against Dr. King: ”No holds were barred. We have used [similar] techniques against Soviet agents. [The same methods were] brought home against any organization against which we were targeted. We did not differentiate. This is a rough, tough business.” The FBI collected information about Dr. King’s plans and activities through an extensive surveillance program, employing nearly every intelligence-gathering technique at the Bureau’s disposal. Wiretaps, which were initially approved by Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, were maintained on Dr. King’s home telephone from October 1963 until mid-1965; the SCLC headquarter’s telephones were covered by wiretaps for an even longer period. Phones in the homes and offices of some of Dr. King’s close advisers were also wiretapped. The FBI has acknowledged 16 occasions on which microphones were hidden in Dr. King’s hotel and motel rooms in an “attempt” to obtain information about the “private activities of King and his advisers” for use to “completely discredit” them.

The MLK, Jr. Encylopedia at Stanford University puts it this way.

The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) began monitoring Martin Luther King, Jr., in December 1955, during his involvement with the Montgomery bus boycott, and engaged in covert operations against him throughout the 1960s. FBI director J. Edgar Hoover was personally hostile toward King, believing that the civil rights leader was influenced by Communists. This animosity increased after April 1964, when King called the FBI ‘‘completely ineffectual in resolving the continued mayhem and brutality inflicted upon the Negro in the deep South’’ (King, 23 April 1964). Under the FBI’s domestic counterintelligence program (COINTELPRO) King was subjected to various kinds of FBI surveillance that produced alleged evidence of extramarital affairs, though no evidence of Communist influence.

It continues, referencing the Church Report…

According to a U.S. Senate Committee convened in the 1970s to investigate the FBI’s domestic intelligence operations, the impact of the FBI’s efforts to discredit SCLC and King on the civil rights movement ‘‘is unquestionable’’ (Senate Select Committee, 183). The committee determined that: ‘‘Rather than trying to discredit the alleged Communists it believed were attempting to influence Dr. King, the Bureau adopted the curious tactic of trying to discredit the supposed target of Communist Party interest—Dr. King himself’’ (Senate Select Committee, 85).

The Church Report provides this:

The FBI now agrees that its efforts to discredit Dr. King were unjustified. The present Deputy Associate Director (Investigation) testified:

Mr. Adams. There were approximately twenty-five incidents of actions taken [to discredit Dr. King] … I see no statutory basis or no basis of justification for the activity.

The CHAIRMAN. Was Dr. King, in his advocacy of equal rights for black citizens, advocating a course of action that in the opinion of the FBI constituted a crime?

Mr. ADAMS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. He was preaching non-violence was he not, as a method of achieving equal rights for black citizens?

Mr. ADAMS. That’s right … Now as far as the activities which you are asking about, the discrediting, I know of no basis for that and I will not attempt to justify it.

The FBI conducted its investigation of Dr. King and the SCLC under an FBI manual provision — called COMINFIL — permitting the investigation of legitimate noncommunist organizations, suspected by the FBI of having been infiltrated by communists, to determine the extent, if any, of communist influence. The FBI’s investigation was based on its concern that Dr. King was being influenced by two persons — hereinafter referred to as Adviser A and Adviser B — that the Bureau believed were members of the Communist Party.

Perhaps you imagine that this is dusty, if shameful, history; nothing like that happens today. You would be mistaken. The FBI, local police officials, and their sister organizations throughout Euorpe and other OECD democracies continue to use the techniques that Edgar Hoover’s FBI developed in its COMINFIL and COINTELPRO programs. Donatella Della Porta has coedited two books that are a useful place for academics to get started: Policing Protest: The Control of Mass Demonstrations in Western Democracies (1998) and The Policing of Transnational Protest (2006). If you are troubled by what you read above about Dr King, you will be equally troubled by what you read in these volumes. You cannot change the past, but making history begins with a grasp of the basic facts.

This piece was originally posted on the author’s blog.

Political Violence Thought of the Week

Demonstrators protest unfair Russian elections in Brussels, 2011. Photo by Flickr user Max Mayorov.

Demonstrators protest unfair Russian elections in Brussels, 2011. Photo by Flickr user Max Mayorov.

By Erica Chenoweth

“Peaceful protests are all we have at our disposal.”

This thought comes from a Russian activist, who suggests that using nonviolent methods of contention is the “only way out” of a Putin-dominated Russian government.

The reason this quote strikes me is that the activist is basically saying that the pro-democracy movement in Russia is nonviolent because there are no other options — it is the last (or only) viable strategy for confronting Putin.

But those using violent methods often similarly evoke this “last resort” or “only available option” explanation. In Jeff Goodwin’s fantastic book, No Other Way Out, he compellingly argues that revolutionary movements are often compelled to use violence against authoritarian regimes because the movements see no other options — violence is the only choice they have at their disposal to resist.

This leads to an interesting thought question: if we randomly polled Russian activists and asked them whether peaceful protest was the only option at their disposal to challenge Putin’s regime, my guess is some would say no. They might cite additional options, like pursuing institutional reforms through other forms of advocacy, increasing voter turnout at elections, bolstering the institutionalized opposition parties, or using violence. They might even claim that the latter options are the only available (and/or viable) ones.

My hunch is that activists’ a priori preferences or beliefs about the utility and effectiveness of nonviolent vs. violent (not to mention institutional vs. non-institutional) forms of struggle might strongly influence which strategies different activists see as available and productive. Take the Syrian uprising, where renewed calls for nonviolent forms of resistance coexist with renewed calls for armed struggle – under identical and increasingly brutal conditions.

Such cases suggest a need for researchers to take activist preferences and agency more seriously — or at least acknowledge more complexity and variation — in the ways that these groups respond to the conditions they face. If recent cases are instructive, then so-called structural factors may not be as influential we often presume.

Friday Puzzler: Why Take Credit for Shooting a Girl?, Answered

By Barbara F. Walter

In her book, Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill, Jessica Stern interviews a jihadist studying at a madrassah in Lahore, Pakistan. Stern asked him what the biggest threat is to their group’s survival. His response? “Free secular education for all.”

This simple sentence is the answer to last week’s puzzler.

Recall the puzzle:

What benefit could any organization, especially one that eventually hopes to lead the Pakistani population, gain from killing a young girl? And why would any organization ever publicly take credit for the shooting, especially after observing the ensuing worldwide outrage?

Malala Yousafzai’s demand for a real education is the key to answering this question. An increase in the literacy rate — especially among women — is the fastest and easiest way to undermine jihadi groups in Pakistan, and the Taliban knows it. Right now, the Taliban is able to spread its brand of extremism in part by offering free education (and often free housing and food) to many of Pakistan’s poorest families. The deal is this: you give us your sons to house and feed, and we get a ready group of future jihadists to indoctrinate.

So why did the Pakistani Taliban try to kill Malala Yousafzai? They tried to kill her because Malala was publicly preaching the one demand that would most successfully undercut their means of recruitment: free secular education for all. If poor families have an alternative to the madrassas, and the mothers of those sons have a basic education, they are far more likely to send their sons and daughters to schools that teach real skills than to the madrassas that do not. Malala’s message threatens the Taliban’s lifeline.

But the question still remains: why take credit for shooting, given the universal outcry? Two reasons. First, the Taliban want to advertise to Pakistanis that demands for educational reform will not be tolerated. As commenter Matthew Cunningham pointed out, the Taliban’s audience is the local population, not Western countries. They need to take credit for the attack if they hope to intimidate the population into submission. Killing anyone who challenges this status quo is simply a way to silence dissent and deter additional protests.

Second, the Taliban took credit because they knew that they were unlikely to be punished. Western countries may have been outraged and publicly condemned the attack, but none of them would ever seriously consider intervening to try to stop further attacks. The Taliban knows quite well that a US military intervention (in fact any military intervention) in the Swat region is inconceivable at this time, and thus they can act as they please.

So a little girl is targeted not because she is especially important, but because her demands for educational reform strike at the very heart of the Taliban’s recruitment mechanism, and they brazenly take credit for it, because no one, including her own government, is willing to stop them.

Embodying Coercion: State Repression in 21 Objects

By Christian Davenport

About 2 weeks ago the New York Times (the once unparalled bastion of all things relevant in the world) published an article about fifty objects that capture the essence of New York over time. Included were things like the an old New York token and the little greek paper cups that you used to see all the time before the mermaid on the Starbucks logo took over. I thought it would be useful to undertake something similar for state repression, as there a great many objects that have come to symbolize/represent the concept. Rather than try to think of 50, however, I preferred to get the list started with 21 and see if you (what Hennessey Youngman likes to call “internet”) have any thoughts on the matter, which I am sure that you do.

The exercise was interesting not only because it revealed insights about the concept, but also because it revealed something about the cases predominant in my own thinking. As a result, organizing the list also provided insights into myself. I present them in the reverse order that they came to me:

21) Black Boots – This came to me as I thought about Nazis (which as an American, as well as an avid film viewer of American films, I think about at least three times a week). Immediately, I see these boots and think about the rest of the Nazi uniform. Interestingly, I immediately think of Doc Martens as representing something that directly counters the stylized, clean professional boot of the Nazi. Of course, neo-Nazis and skinheads used to wear these boots as well, so the idea is short lived.

20) German Shepard - Dwelling on the Nazis, while many will associate these aggressive dogs simply with Nazis, those familiar with the American Civil Rights movement will also associate them with white racists attacking African Americans.

19) Bars – This is simply referring to those used to confine political prisoners.

18) The Guillotine – Used to remove the heads of those who were believed to challenge the new political authorities; although associated with revolutionary France, this device was used in other countries as well.

17) Mace – Most recently we saw it used against sitting protestors at the University of California, but mace has been employed quite frequently against protestors from around the world. Intricately connected with what is referred to as “torture-lite”, mace is part of a new series of tactics used by authorities to control individuals engaged in behavioral challenges without leaving physical marks on the body or causing them irreparable damage.

16) The Pig – Popularized by the Black Panther Party, pig imagery was commonly used to describe police officers or anyone that assisted in the perpetration of inequality and social injustice.

15) Mirrored Glass – Remember the film Cool Hand Luke? How about the last time that you saw a traffic cop or an image of a police officer during the recent anti-NATO protest in Chicago? It’s the style that never goes out of style for the officer on the go.

14) Batteries with Cables – Frequently used to engage in more conventional methods of torture by shooting electricity through the human body.

13) Metal Table – One might see the slab with leather attachments to hold individuals down or occasionally with holes in them for air or other devices (like the battery leads mentioned above).

12) Swiveling Lights – You might think of this as a light used during an interrogation or an instance of torture. It swings back and forth on a cord and radiates starkly on the victim below.

11) Gun/Utility Belt – Just what the active repressive agent needs for all occasions: gun, flashlight, pepper spray, cuffs (metal or plastic), keys, radio, etc.

10) The Ovens – During the Holocaust Germans created these devices to eliminate more victims and also reduce the likelihood of resistance, bolstering their ability to enact their genocidal goals.

9) The Tank – Immortalized forever in Tiananmen Square, tanks have been used to suppress popular uprisings since their invention. Although commonly considered the domain of interstate war, tanks were commonly employed when more localized authorities felt overwhelmed.

8) The Poplar Tree – Used to lynch African-Americans, but others as well, especially during the mid-1800s through the mid-1900s. Billy Holiday sang about this in the early 1900s. One might not associate lynching with state repression, but the degree of government complicity in such activities were pretty significant.

7) The Riot Shield – These have increased in size over time, but they always bulletproof.

6) The Bug – This includes devices inside telephones, stuck behind walls, placed on individuals bodies that record what people say so that authorities can better understand what is taking place and respond accordingly.

5) The Cross – Yes, the one that Christ was nailed to and which represents one of the most widely seen mechanisms of torture used against political dissidents on the planet.

4) The Rack – This long piece of wood (the prototype to the metal slab) was used for long periods of time, principally in Europe.

3) Wingtip Shoes – It was rumored during the 1960s and 1970s that the best way to identify an FBI agent is to look down at their shoes: the FBI wore dress shoes, and the people that they were trying to infiltrate sneakers or sandals.

2) The Water Cannon – Used against African-American civil rights workers and other protestors from the 1960s onward. Less poplar now, but they were extremely prevalent at one time.

1) The Camps – There was a gate, several rows of buildings, guard towers, Nazis and occasionally train tracks and the ovens mentioned above. From research, we discover that there were not only death camps but work camps as well and that individuals frequently moved between different camps throughout World War II.

Thoughts?

Images by unknown photographerunknown painter, and Jeff Widener and the AP; all via Wikimedia.

Political Violence Thought of the Week

By Erica Chenoweth

“Practically, this process is positive.”

~ Bashar al Assad, commenting on recent defections, as quoted in Hassan Hassan’s article “Assad’s Massacre Strategy”.

Apparently, Assad would prefer a “a small, committed core of officials committed to crushing the revolt than a broader regime infiltrated by traitors,” as Hassan puts it. Although many conflict scholars view defections as a sign of regime weakness, Assad may see it as a process of voluntary purging, thus strengthening the regime. More will be revealed as to whether Assad is right.

Violence in America, Redux

By Christian Davenport

This post is part of the “Would Someone Please Explain This to Me?” series. Thank you for all of the excellent questions readers asked, and we’ll do our best to answer them over the next few weeks. 

Last week Pauline Moore asked the following:

“What do the recent horrific shootings in Colorado say about the nature of political violence in the U.S.? More broadly, what do events like this say about the nature of political violence in democracies? Most of the analysis offered on this blog has been dedicated to political violence in non-democratic states (understandably so, as the scale and intensity of political violence is greater in these countries, and the instances thereof much more frequent). But political violence certainly exists in democracies, albeit in drastically different form.”

I recently wrote an article that addressed some of these questions: “When Democracies Kill: Reflections from the US, India, and Northern Ireland”, published in the International Area Studies Review. I say “some” because (as is frequently the case) I am generally interested with what governments do and, as in most contexts, I maintain that they are responsible for most politically-related deaths on the planet — the sea and outer space are still up for grabs. I also consider deaths that governments are complicit in: i.e., deaths that they could stop if they put forth the effort.

This does and does not get at Pauline’s question. I believe that events like the shootings in Colorado tell us very little about the nature of “political violence” in the US. While mass shootings are violent and take place in the US, I think that there is very little about them that was “political” (i.e., they were not designed to influence who gets what, where and why; they do not directly nor indirectly involve the sovereign authority and proportionally they did not impact a large number of people). In part, this is because mass shooting like the attack in Aurora are typically limited to a single homicidal maniac with no grand agenda and no partners or affiliates. Clearly this is very different from the highly-politicized killing that took place in Norway last year, McVeigh’s bombing in Oklahoma and, more relevant to my discussion, people executed by the US government on a yearly basis, those tortured in “Gitmo” and Abu Ghraib as well as those victimized by police brutality.

Within “When Democracies Kill”, I argue that generally democratic governments appear to kill for political reasons when

(1) political threats are perceived by authorities as well as ordinary citizens, (2) when victims are not viewed as core members of the polity, (3) when some measure of legality is provided for the repressive process, and (4) when the application of repression is viewed as being small-scale and non-systematic. Three factors emerge from detailed case observations of political conflict within the United States, India, and Northern Ireland that I have been undertaking for various periods of time over the last 15 years. In this work, democracies appear to kill because of their (5) highly decentralized structure, (6) the fact that they engage in the worst activity before the polity is politically ‘opened’ and (7) relevant behavior takes place within areas that were created to be isolated from the rest of society (both psychologically as well as physically)

As one can see from the list, I am less concerned (although no less saddened and troubled) by the random actions of an insane few than I am the systematic and much more destructive acts of a seemingly rational many. Therefore, in the US I am less concerned with the Aurora killings and Colombine than the historical pattern of anti-black violence. By this, I am referring to the brutal activities unleashed during slavery between 1654-1860 (forced labor, killing, rape and torture), the period of lynching which followed 1880-1950 (torture and killing) as well as the inhumane and highly biased activities that exist within and outside of the prison system from the late 1800s to the present (i.e., psychological intimidation, imprisonment, beating, rape, torture and killing). These crimes were and are not few in number, they do not involve small numbers of individuals and, quite frequently, there is no question that agents of the government directly participated. In short, these are highly political in the traditional sense. If one includes “outrages” (i.e., anti-black activity undertaken right after the civil war), “race riots” (the white, anti-black ones of the early 1900s), church burnings from 1989-1996 as well as “hate crimes” from 1996-2009, the number of abuses, numbers of victims as well as perpetrators would skyrocket. When one also contemplates adding in black on black violence (gang related and otherwise), which I maintain is directly under the jurisdiction of the US government as it is supposed to protect the lives of all those who live under their domain, the reader’s head might just explode.

Police arrest during the Watts Riots, August 12, 1965. New York World-Telegram, via Wikimedia.

Now, I’m trying to get my head around these activities and with the sheer duration of time involved, the vastness of the degree of coordination across space and the significance of all this violence for not only the African American community but the US itself, it is clear that we have our work cut out for us – all of those that have an interest in political violence not just African Americans or those directly interested in/sympathetic to them. Indeed, as I just got a file with four million slaves from 1850, by plantation (indicating their age, race/color, perceived sanity and whether they had escaped), my team now contemplates what can be done with such information and they are slightly overwhelmed by how far we have to go before we can begin to understand what happened. Actually, feel free to join us at my unfinished and perhaps unfinishable project: Strange Fruit Incorporated.

I have selected violence specifically related to African Americans, for a variety of reasons. To have a conversation, however – a real conversation about violence in America — we would need to bring together information regarding Native Americans, women, Latinos, Asians, Whites and everybody else. To address and understand America the ugly, the whole pie, the whole melting pot needs to be identified, catalogued and then put back together. But, I suggest that we do not stop there. Violence in America needs to address the fact that political refugees from violence places around the world flock to the US. Does this have any influence the US or those entering? What impact does it have? Invoking a old, highly controversial but not well understood phrase, we need to pay attention to “structural violence” in the US and not just the most overt, most obvious manifestations. This is particularly relevant to the Native population but also African Americans, Latinos and poor Whites. Individuals die daily because of this activity/system but as there is no clearly identifiable weapon and perpetrator involved or, rather, the weapons and the perpetrators do not wear uniforms of the US government, as a community of scholars focused on quickly accumulated dead bodies, we have generally let this topic go. But, this is probably not appropriate – even given the conventional definition of politics offered above. If someone systematically and consistently does not get what is necessary to sustain life, if this knowledge is held by those in political power and if nothing is done, then this is as political as a political execution. Finally, Violence by America needs to be dealt with as well. The US is one of the leading actors in the world regarding violent activity (military and police related), training and weapons distribution (something related back to Violence in America, I suppose). With all that done perhaps we could speculate about the connections between Violence in and Violence by America. Perhaps then we could move beyond discussions of lone gunmen shooting up a movie theater in Colorado.

Uncle Sam and Hate Groups

By Will H. Moore


F.B.I. Seal, via Wikimedia.

“There is always the possibility that a secret police system may become a menace to free government and free institutions because it carries with it the possibility of abuses of power which are not always quickly apprehended or understood.”

US Attorney General Harlen Fiske Stone, reflecting on the creation of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1924.

Last week I posted about hate crimes in the USA, and given Christian Davenport’s request that we  give state violence a chance, today I offer a view of the state.  I make four points:

  1. Some prominent democratic theorists develop institutional recommendations due to concern of such abuse of power.
  2. US government agents of coercion have a long history of the abuse these theorists worry about.
  3. As Davenport would anticipate, the discussion in my post hides the state, as if it is uninvolved.
  4. Hate groups see the state, alleging that the US federal government is engaged in precisely the abuse of power discussed in points one and two.

Mr. Stone, quoted above, was concerned that the F.B.I. might abuse its power.  His concern was well founded.  But I will generalize and strengthen the concern: governments will use agents in their coercive apparatus to undermine and, if possible, eliminate political rivals.  The tricky bit there is the phrase “if possible.”  We might ask: how can people constrain Leviathan?  If governments are able to enforce a claim on the legitimate use of force in the territory over which they assert sovereignty, then what, pray tell, will prevent those who rule from predating on those whose support is not required to retain office?  As Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith argue in The Dictator’s Handbook (Op-Ed version here), successful (i.e., long ruling) political leaders reward those they must and take from those they can  (they apply the argument to leaders of democracies as well).  As Publius famously put the dilemma in Federalist #10

“There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one, by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests.”

He opines that “the most powerful faction must be expected to prevail,” and wonders how the less powerful might be protected (I have, judiciously, excised from that quote the preceding clause, “the most numerous party,” by which Publius limits the argument to majoritarian rule, but you get the point).   Majority rule, the bedrock of Democratic theory, is a source of threat, not a solution.  Separation of powers across local, state, and federal levels is the proposed solution.

But let us return to agents of government coercion, and indeed, the prominent democratic theorist Robert Dahl provides a helpful segue, as he echoes Mr. Stone’s concern quite precisely, writing in chapter 4 of his famous work Polyarchy:

“Axiom 4: The likelihood that a government will tolerate an opposition increases as the resources available to the government for suppression decline relative to the resources of an opposition.  Now the key resources that governments use to suppress oppositions are of two broad types: violent means of coercion, persuasion, and inducement, typically wielded by military and police forces; and nonviolent means of coercion, persuasion, and inducement, or, as they will be called here, socioeconomic sanctions, chiefly in the form of control over economic resources, means of communication, and processes of education and political socialization…  Two very general kinds of circumstances can reduce the capacity of a government to use violence or socioeconomic sanctions against an opposition. First, these factors sometimes cease to be available as political resources. This possibility is particularly relevant to violence against opponents of the government by police or military forces, for the police and military may actually be very small, or, what amounts to very nearly the same thing, they may become so depoliticized that they can no longer be used by political leaders for internal political purposes. Second, these (and other) political resources may be so widely dispersed that no unified group, including the government (or a unified group of leaders in the government) has a monopoly over them…”

That is, Dahl reaches the same conclusion as both Publius and Mr. Stone: concentration of coercive capacity in a federal agency threatens minority groups and dissidents.

In a remarkable series of articles (2003, 2004, 2007, 2009) and a book the sociologist David Cunningham contrasts the F.B.I.’s programs to “neutralize” (that was the official F.B.I. term) “White Hate Groups” (1964-1971) and the “New Left” (1968-1971).  Between 1954 and 1971 the Bureau operated five of these counter intelligence programs (COINTELPRO, in the agency’s lexicon), each of which was terminated after the 1971 publication of hundreds of stolen COINTELPRO files (the public backlash would help stimulate the 1975 Church Committee hearings in the US Senate).  Historical research documents that the COINTELPRO programs routinized the domestic spying and disruption of dissident groups that Director J. Edgar Hoover undertook with the encouragement of, and eventual directives from, President Frankin Roosevelt (e.g., Croog).  And Cunningham finds a remarkable consistency of techniques used against in both the “White Hate Group” and the “New Left” programs: the use of informants and the production of false documents to create a negative public image; break down internal organization; restrict ability to protest; and hinder the ability of individuals targets to participate in group activities.  Needless to say, the F.B.I.’s “White Hate Group” COINTELPRO violated a variety of the targeted white supremacists’ civil and political rights.

@WilHMoo

Give State (Repression) a Chance

By Christian Davenport

All we are saying… is give states a chance (repeat for effect).

Next time you write an article or book on political violence, think about state repression — genocide, one-sided violence, human rights violation, torture, protest policing, counter-insurgency/terrorism — for a second. Just a second. After several decades of rigorous effort, it is fair to say that the majority of our attention in political science has been given to interstate war and civil war. I would say that it would be interesting to count the number of articles over the last five years on terrorism and compare it to the number of articles on repression but regardless, I stand by the claim that most of our attention has been focused on those activities that challenge political authorities. Actually, it’s probably not even close.

Why is this the case? Why do governments get a pass? Well, it’s not because of the actual number of deaths associated with different forms of violence. Chinese and Russian repression alone is believed to account for the deaths of over 200 million people. It’s also not because repression isn’t interesting; Hitler, Pol Pot, McCarthyism and the Red Scare, Cardinal Richelieu, Assad… what’s not to like (or, hate)? It’s the stuff Hollywood films are made of — literally. We also don’t suffer from a lack of information about government repression. The Sudanese state’s actions in Darfur (or as my autocorrect wants to say, “earful”) and their architect Omar al-Bashir are in the news almost daily (no), weekly (no), quarterly (ummm), and victims of state repression have spread globally, with some more than ready to talk.

I would argue that scholars, especially those in political science, who study challenges to governments do so because this is what governments want us to study. In many ways the targets of political scientists’ gaze has been shaped by those whom we examine. This is what governments and foundations pay for — mostly. What’s the last call or program from a government or prominent foundation regarding state repression that you recall seeing posted? Minerva that. The US State Department does produce reports on government oppression in individual countries, but there is little discussion about the war on terror’s inherent coercive government activities; certainly less than the discussion devoted to potential government challengers. Seen any government-sponsored commissions exploring state repression outside of those sparked by the very-public — and subsequently ignored — abuses at Abu Ghraib and Gitmo? Interestingly, newspapers are likely to cover anti-state behavior (historically relying upon governments themselves for stories) as well as what those who use these sources are likely to study. Now I’m not dissing Amnesty, Human Rights Watch, or State Department country reports, but these sources don’t go back far enough, and you know how political scientists like a good time series. New data is being collected but generally it is not focused on repressive behavior. Finally, stories about anti-state challengers are what citizens want to know about — the subversives are out there, you know.

As a result, we end up knowing much less about governments and repressive action than we do revolutionaries and revolution, protesters and protest, rebels and rebellion, and terrorists and terrorism. Here’s the kicker: it turns out that government repression is intricately connected with all of the contentious actors and actions identified above, or at least research is beginning to suggest this relationship. To understand the mass resistance of the Arab Spring, therefore, you have to understand the “Arab Winter’s” decades of regime repression. It might be good for the Arab “Summer” and “Fall” as well (just wait for these, they’re coming). While debates rage about whether or not and, more importantly, how aggregate/distant proxy variables such as democracy and economic development affect societies, barely a murmur has been heard about the importance of state repressive action in provoking challenges to the state itself. Even less is mentioned about what governments do covertly against potential as well as actual challenges before, during, and after overt challenges manifest.

Next time you pick up the pen, touch the keyboard or turn on that dictation software, therefore, all we are saying… is give states a chance (repeat for effect)

Note: John Lennon might have mixed emotions about my use of the phrase but after reflecting I think he would agree. It also doesn’t really fit the song’s rhythm either, but maybe Kanye West could come up with something — he is a genius after all.

Why No One Wants to Call Syria a Civil War

By Barbara F. Walter and Elizabeth Martin

Syria has been in the midst of a civil war since at least July of last year yet no one wants to call it that. U.S. politicians, Prime Ministers, members of the UN, the Arab League all refer to the situation in Syria as one that is “sliding towards civil war” or “heading towards civil war.” But almost no one is actually calling it a civil war.

But by all accounts the violence in Syria is a civil war. Syria long ago reached the 1,000 battle death threshold experts on civil war use to classify conflict as civil war. If this is the case, why is everyone tip-toeing around the issue?

We think there are at least 4 reasons why no one wants to call the violence in Syria a civil war. First, no politician wants to be connected to a conflict that has deteriorated on their watch.  Second, the term “civil war” conjures up images of a long, bloody war, which is bad news for markets and election cycles. Third, labeling the violence as something as organized and destructive as a “civil war” creates political pressure for wealthier more powerful states to “do something.” Given the lengthy and costly US intervention in Iraq, Americans simply have no stomach for another difficult intervention in another Middle Eastern country.

But this still doesn’t explain why journalists don’t use the correct term. This is a trickier question to answer but one that gets to the zeitgeist of Americans more generally. No one in America, including journalists and editors at its major newspapers, wants to send American soldiers back to the Middle East.

So what does all this mean?  Whenever the world refuses to call a spade a spade it’s because the world doesn’t want to get involved. The less willing outside states are to acknowledge the true extent of the crisis, the less pressure there will be to intervene. On the surface, this may seem irresponsible. But if intervention will have no effect, or perhaps only serve to make matters worse, clever semantics that serve to obscure reality may be more responsible than those that make it crystal clear.

See Page Fortna’s post on whether the Arab revolts are likely to lead to democratization.

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