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Posts tagged ‘Yemen’

Poliscifi II: War Sanitized

By Joseph Young

“A Taste of Armageddon.” Via Memory Alpha.

After receiving generally positive feedback about poliscifi I thought I’d dip my toes in that water once again — it’s easy for me you see.  My father is an avid Star Trek fan. He grew up with the old episodes, and when I was a kid we would watch The Next Generation and reruns of the original series together. Today, my kids watch shows like Dora and Blues Clues, but I was raised on Trek, the Hulk, Spider Man, and Star Wars (ever wonder why I’m so interested in violence?). One episode which my father and I watched several times together, “A Taste of Armageddon,” is some of the best poliscifi of all time.

This episode follows Star Trek’s main script: Captain Kirk and friends find a planet, encounter people that look a lot like us and are a threat to the crew and the Enterprise, and Kirk and friends (not the red guys, they always die) must find a cagey way out. It diverges a bit as I don’t recall Kirk being smooth with the ladies. Anyway, the critical details are these: the planet has had a long feud between two rival civilizations. Rather than continue to decimate each other in war, the two nations instead engage in a computer simulation. The simulation is a classic war game that allows a computational model to provide attacks and counterattacks and selects the individuals that “died” during the game. These individuals are then sent to disintegration chambers — the ultimate in sanitized conflict. This practice reduces the destruction of buildings and the environment, and created a stable equilibrium. What does this have to do with Kirk, Spock, and the good Doctor? They, of course, are selected for disintegration and have to convince the two parties of the madness of the whole endeavor.

Like many Star Trek episodes, this story is an allegory set in the shadow of the cold war. Regardless of Gene Rodenberry’s intent, “A Taste if Armageddon” provides some fodder for discussions of our current Drone War. Let’s assume that Peter Bergan is accurate, and the US has not killed a single civilian this year in Pakistan. Is this form of war moral?  We can also assume Peter Bergan is mistaken, and then ask the same question. If we have operators/pilots managing a machine, killing alleged militants in Afghanistan in the morning and in Yemen after lunch, how different is this than the game from Star Trek? Sure, it may be a bit more one-sided, but the remote killing of the drone war has the same sanitized feeling. Not surprisingly, some observers chafed when news broke that the Pentagon is considering awarding Medals of Valor for drone operators/pilots.

Returning to the Enterprise, Captain Kirk gives an impassioned speech to one of the leaders of the warring nations in an attempt to end the war game:

“Death, destruction, disease, horror…that’s what war is all about…that’s what makes it a thing to be avoided. You’ve made it so neat and painless you’ve had no reason to stop it…we can admit we’re barbarians but we’re not going to kill today.”

The current debate over drones is often couched in utilitarian terms and arguments that US forces “are killing fewer civilians by using this pinpoint technology.” By using this sanitized version of war, are we also potentially numbing our population to its horrible costs?

Will the Middle East and North Africa Democratize? Part II

By Erica Chenoweth

Protest in Bahrain, 2011. Photo by Bahrain in Pictures, via Wikimedia.

Following up on Part I from last week, two things.

First, check out Page Fortna’s response, wherein she corrects a few of the erroneous inferences I drew from her piece with Reyko Huang. Mea culpa.

Second, I want to share my own take about how I see the Arab Spring cases playing out.

It’ll take some time, but my hunch is that the dictatorships that faced nonviolent or “people power” revolutions (e.g., Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain) will be quicker to transition to (or make progress toward) democracy than the dictatorships facing violent uprisings (e.g., Libya) or those facing no sustained challenges at all (e.g., Algeria, Saudi Arabia). Campaigns relying on a fairly even mix of nonviolent and violent methods (e.g. Yemen, Syria) are crapshoots but will probably remain autocratic.

This suspicion is based on the simple idea that the method of mobilization matters. In a recent book with Maria Stephan, she and I find that movements tend to rule using the same methods they used to win. If the campaign has succeeded using violence, it typically rules with violence. Likewise, mixed campaigns will probably rely on a mix of nonviolent and violent strategies to rule. But if the campaign succeeds using civil resistance, it is much more likely to ultimately embrace and institutionalize nonviolent forms of political contestation and conflict resolution. The new leadership is aware of the need to maintain legitimacy among a civilian population experienced in taking risks to remove oppressive or unjust systems. They become more responsive. Civil resistance is like social capital on steroids. Just ask Lech Walesa, who had to deal with way more protests during his first term as the president of a free Poland than Solidarity had organized during the anti-Communist campaign.

OK, some readers are thinking, “Well, duh. The dictatorships that have nonviolent movements are the ones that allow space for organizing already. So they already have some democratic features, are already open to reform, and are probably already democratizing before the nonviolent movement even emerges.”

You would think so, and this may be true some of the time. But in practice, this is not always the case.

A 2005 Freedom House study looked at dozens of transitions to democracy since 1960. The study found that bottom-up civic disruption was a primary driver of these transitions—more so even than top-down, elite-led reforms—and often in spite of extremely “closed” systems. In a follow-up study, Freedom House found that this civic disruption was bottom-up, generated by ordinary civilians who were actively organizing and creating opportunities for change, rather than by the economic or social conditions we typically associate with democratization. Maria and I also find little support for the endogeneity argument in our book. For example, nonviolent campaigns such as the First Palestinian Intifada, the People Power movement in the Philippines, Serbia, and Poland emerged in spite of highly restrictive and repressive conditions, seized what power they could get, and then began to expand that power, creating the opportunities they needed to produce high-level change. As Frederick Douglass aptly noted, “Power concedes nothing without a demand” (h/t to Jack DuVall). No one ever gave these people political space to rise up. Every inch of political space was hard fought, and hard won, by these movements. And although there are important exceptions, in most cases, nonviolent campaigns lead to more peaceful, stable, democratic conditions.

Some of you are thinking: “Well, the violent campaigns use violence because they face particularly brutal regimes and are therefore forced to use arms.” Don’t get me started. That’s another post altogether.

American officials have had a difficult time developing a coherent strategy to responding to the Arab uprisings, perhaps because of reservations about the outcomes of popular uprisings. They are often unsure of whom they should support in ongoing conflicts around the world. Here’s the deal. Supporting armed rebels probably helps them to succeed, but we find that victorious armed rebellions rarely lead to democracy. They usually lead to the opposite.

Supporting nonviolent movements with pro-democracy aims through civilian and diplomatic instruments may or may not help them to succeed. But if the U.S. is really interested in promoting democracy, it’s time to get more creative about supporting unarmed campaigns rather than armed ones.

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